In Bustamante v. Napolitano, the Second Circuit looked at question of exclusive jurisdiction in those 1447(b) cases that are among my favorites of late. Remember, a naturalization applicant can file an action in U.S. District Court if the USCIS fails to decide an application by 120 days of the applicant’s interview.
In Bustamante, USCIS decided against the applicant after he had filed the 1447(b), on the basis that the applicant had committed manslaughter many years earlier.
“Defendants then brought a motion to dismiss the Section 1447(b) petition as moot based on USCIS’s denial of the application. Bustamante countered that USCIS’s denial of the naturalization application had no legal consequence because the filing of the Section 1447(b) petition divested USCIS of jurisdiction.”
The District Court liked USCIS’s argument and dismissed the case. In the appeal that followed, the Circuit Court took on the question of jurisdiction and mootness determining that the defendant was correct as to who has exclusive jurisdiction—District Court. In so doing, they produced this curious gem:
In holding that the district court possesses exclusive jurisdiction to decide a naturalization petition as to which a Section 1447(b) complaint has been filed, we do not suggest that upon the applicant’s invocation of a district court’s Section 1447(b) jurisdiction, USCIS is barred from continuing its consideration of the naturalization application or from reaching a tentative determination. Certain practical realities might support such agency action. Section 1447(b) is triggered, after all, by agency delay. No one’s interest are served by compelling further delay. Inevitably, the district court will solicit the parties’ views on a Section 1447(b) petition before determining whether to reach the merits of the application or remand to the agency. The parties will likely stipulate to a remand if USCIS tentatively recommends that an application be granted. Even with applications that USCIS intends to deny and for which no stipulation would be expected, USCIS is entitled to request a remand. Thus, a system of district court/agency cooperation where, even upon the former’s acquisition of jurisdiction, the latter continues its consideration of a matter, but requires court permission before it can put any decision into effect, may make sense. Such coordination is not unprecedented. Cf. Toliver v. County of Sullivan, 957 F.2d 47, 49 (2d Cir.1992) (per curiam) (holding that “the district court may grant a rule 60(b) motion after an appeal is taken only if the moving party obtains permission from the circuit court,” and that “this court must first give its consent so it can remand the case”).
Is it a chink in the armor or a one time situation quickly to be resolved or mooted? Stay tuned. As long as there are stalled naturalization applications, there will be the glorious provision of 1447(b) to jump start them.